Lecce, Italia
Investigating from a phenomenological point of view such concepts as “motivation”, “action”, “reason”, “cause” etc. confronts us with theoretical problems which become even more evident when we try to take into account different “ontological regions” and their interconnections. Are all those notions – and more generally the very ideas of “mind”, and “Geist” – reducible without any residue, so to speak, to naturalistically defined counterparts, by using the conceptual machinery of one or the other variant of supervenience theory? Or should we, even admitting that there is one natural world, accept a form of pluralism that allows for each different aspect or mode of description to be partially autonomous? For, in any case, we must take into account different kinds of dependencies (logical, ontological, epistemological, cultural and so on) which “structure” the one world we live in.
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