Resumen de Argomenti aristotelici contro l’esistenza di un Essere per essenza
Aristotle argues against the possibility that being is the essence of anything in An. post. II 7, 92 b 13-14, a passage already quoted by Anscombe and Geach in Three Philosophers. In Metaph. III 4, 1001 a 4-b 1, Aristotle, discussing the thesis of Pythagoreans and Plato, refuses the existence of a Being, whose essence would be «Being itself» and «One itself», showing that it should have as a consequence the monism of Parmenides. The famous passage of Metaph. II 1, 993 b 23-31 (the causality of maximum), often used in favour of a maxime ens, has to be interpreted in a different way. Thomas Aquinas, when speaks of God as an esse ipsum, does not mean esse as existence, but refers to the esse of God.
