On the Probability of There Being Nothing at All

• Peter Van Inwagen ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Notre Dame

     University of Notre Dame

     Township of Portage, Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 43, Nº. 1, 2021 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Il nulla e il problema del fondamento / coord. por Giuseppe Nicolaci, Paolo Piccari), págs. 15-27
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In a 1996 essay, “Why Is There Anything at All?” I examined an argument for the conclusion that the probability of there being nothing was 0. My former student Dustin Crummett has recently shown that one of the premises of that ar-gument is demonstrably false. In the present essay, I present a weaker version of the argument, the conclusion of which is that the probability of there being nothing is at most infinitesimal. I show that this version does not depend on the premise Crum-mett showed to be false, and I suggest, finally, a reason for supposing that another of the argument’s premises is open to serious doubt.