En este trabajo analizo el entramado conceptual de la concepcio?n causal de la meta?fora (Davidson 1978). Para ello me enfocare? en primer lugar en su discusio?n con las concepciones sema?nticas, lo que nos llevara? a discutir el tratamiento davidsoniano de la nocio?n de significado y su distincio?n entre significado de la oracio?n y significado del hablante. Luego planteare? un problema interno a este enfoque, en te?rminos de co?mo entender esta u?ltima distincio?n dentro del marco nominalista del pragmatismo davidsoniano. Finalmente, analizare? las consecuencias de adoptar este enfoque a la hora de pensar a las meta?foras como vehi?culos para la transmisio?n de contenido cognitivo.
In this paper I look into the conceptual fabric of the causal account of metaphor (Davidson 1978). I will first focus on its debate with prior semantic accounts, which will lead us towards Davidson’s treatment of the notion of meaning and his distinction between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning. I will then present what I take to be an internal problem for the causal account, in terms of how to make viable Davidson’s distinction within the framework of his pragmatist nominalism. In conclusion, I will look into the consequences of embracing a causal account for the idea of metaphors as vehicles for the transmission of cognitive content.
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