On which 'God' should be the target of a 'Proof of God's Existence'

• Autores: David Twetten
• Localización: The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy / Ioanna Kuçuradi (ed. lit.), Stephen Voss (ed. lit.), Cemal Güzel (ed. lit.), Vol. 8, 2006 (Philosophy of Religion), ISBN 975-7748-34-X, págs. 75-80
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Philosophers of religion debate what is meant by the word 'God,' in the conclusion of proofs of God's existence. If'God' is a proper name, there seems to be no good proof that a non-empirical entity has this name. If it is a common name, it seems that it must mean what classical theists mean by 'God' - and the existence of such a being is hard to prove. I defend a third possibility: that 'God' names a common name that is the least prescriptive possible, while being sufficient to signify one kind of thing different from all others.