La critica lulliana alla teoria averroista della felicità speculativa
- Autores: Francesco Fiorentino
- Localización: Knowledge, contemplation and Lullism: contributions to the Lullian session at the SIEPM congress - Freising, August 20-25, 2012 / coord. por José Higuera Rubio, 2015, ISBN 978-2-503-54853-1, págs. 89-107
- Idioma: italiano
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
Aquinas believes that natural desire is ordered towards the goal of the beatific vision, which is both natural and supernatural, but human nature cannot achieve this through its natural resources alone, and it requires the help of supernatural grace. This theory diverges from Averroism, whereby man is naturally ordered to achieve full happiness through philosophical knowledge. For Aquinas, the human being - in via - is inevitably linked to perception and objects, and knows clearly that these are effects that lead back to the supreme cause. However, the question about the quid est of all causes is an impenetrable field for rationality. Henry of Ghent demonstrates in the Summa (art. 4) that natural desire is a property of the intellect, whose perfection must seek good of its own free will ; this improvement aims at the movement from a less perfect knowledge to a more perfect one. But, as Henry maintained, that movement cannot be confined to the natural level, a view that the Averroist philosophers and Dante - in the Convivio - defended : the natural desire is not capable of reaching out beyond what is possible because it is a property of natural reason. This contribution aims to show how Llull reacted to this Averroist thesis, after the Paris condemnation of 1277, particularly in the Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita (1298) and other works against the Averroists (1309-1311).
