Transference, or identity theories of causation?

• Autores: María José García Encinas
• Localización: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science, ISSN 0495-4548, Vol. 19, Nº 49, 2004, págs. 31-48
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this it not possible. First, I show that available accounts of 'transference' ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation it (non-relational) identity.