Belief, Rationality, and Psychophysical Laws

• Autores: Henry Jackman
• Localización: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy / coord. por Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Lawson, Vol. 9, 2001 (Philosophy of Mind), ISBN 9781889680132, págs. 47-54
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Davidson has argued that the connection between belief and the “constitutive ideal of rationality” precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities between mental and physical events. However, there are radically different ways to understand both the nature and the content of this “constitutive ideal,” and the plausibility of Davidson’s argument depends on blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal will allow it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.