Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking

• Autores: James H. Fetzer
• Localización: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy / coord. por Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Lawson, Vol. 9, 2001 (Philosophy of Mind), ISBN 9781889680132, págs. 103-113
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic (or “signusing”) systems for which signs stand for other things for those systems. Computing, at best, turns out to be no more than a special kind of thinking.