La segunda persona en epistemología

• Autores: Jesús Vega Encabo
• Localización: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 41, Nº. 2, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: The Second-Person Perspective of Psychological Attributions /La perspectiva de segunda persona en las atribuciones psicológicas), págs. 231-248
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • This paper explores some recent proposals that apply second-person ideas to model some of our epistemic interactions. After criticizing those views that rely on the specific constitution of second-person reasons, either as reasons to trust or as reasons to accept or revise beliefs derived from mutual demands and relations of recognition, it is argued that it makes sense to incorporate some of the intuitions of the second-person model to characterise our testimonial and deliberative practices if one attends to how one learns to be an epistemic agent in contexts in which we share knowledge.