Gli sviluppi dell'interpretazione dell'anima mundi nel pensiero filosofico di Guglielmo di Conches

• Autores: Carmine Ferrara
• Localización: Antonianum, ISSN 0003-6064, Nº. 3, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Iulius - September), págs. 617-640
• Idioma: italiano
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• Resumen
  • español

    Como es sabido, en el siglo XII el Timeo de Platón fue objeto de renovada atención, especialmente en el ambiente cultural de Chartres. El interés por este dialogo se tradujo a menudo en obras de comentario, pero también en tratados filosóficos, teológicos y exegéticos evidentemente inspirados en la enseñanza cosmológica del Timeo, en algunos de los cuales el anima mundi se identificaba, según el caso, con el Espíritu Santo, según una exégesis que tuvo cierto éxito en las primeras décadas del siglo y que fue formalmente condenada por el Concilio de Sens en 1140/41. Entre los autores que sustentaron esta identidad, un lugar relevante pertenece sin duda a Guillermo de Conches. El maestro de Chartres produjo no solo glosas para autores como Boecio, Platón, Macarobio y Prisciano, sino también dos tratados sobre filosofía natural, a saber, Philosophia, objeto de una despiadada acusación poco antes del Concilio de Senns, conocida como De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, del monje cisterciense Guillermo de Saint Thierry, y el Dragmaticon Philosophiae. Este último tratado retoma los contenidos de la Philosophia con ampliaciones y reelaboraciones decisivas, pero nunca hace referencia alguna a las doctrinas del anima mundi y la correspondencia de ésta con el Espíritu Santo. Se ha señalado repetidamente, incluso en estudios recientes, que las dos doctrinas antes mencionadas también fueron condenadas en el De erroribus y que, en consecuencia, la elección de Guillermo de Conches para borrarlas del Dragmaticon Philosophiae dependía tanto de la acusación de Guillermo de Saint Thierry, ambos de la condena al Concilio de Sens. Pero del análisis de los escritos polémicos de Guillermo de Saint Thierry es evidente que él nunca atribuye explícitamente la doctrina de la correspondencia a Guillermo de Conches y, de hecho, no podría haberlo hecho: si, de hecho, Chartres la apoya explícitamente en las Glosse alla Consolatio Philosophiae, ya en Philosophia y luego en la Glosse al Timaeus toma una posición neutra respecto a esta identidad, presentándola como una de las posiciones más difundidas en su tiempo. Si parece tener sentido la idea de que Guillermo ha abandonado la doctrina de la identidad anima mundi - Espíritu Santo porque estaba condenado a Sens, parece más bien forzado afirmar que también abandonó la doctrina del anima mundi por las mismas razones: es de hecho la primera doctrina que ha sido juzgada herética y no la segunda. Si Guillermo hubiera considerado verdaderamente indispensable recurrir a esta figura cosmológica para explicar el devenir cósmico, no habría renunciado a ella tan fácilmente. Si renunció a ella es porque evidentemente tenía motivaciones filosóficas bien fundadas. Lo que se pretende demostrar en este ensayo es que, en el Dragmaticon, Guillermo disolvió definitivamente el integumentum del anima mundi, atribuyendo las prerrogativas y funciones que este principi cosmológico ostentaba y realizaba sólo en sentido figurado, a principis causales concretos, es decir, a la naturaleza de las cosas y a las almas individuales.

  • English

    As is known, in the twelfith century Plato's Timaeus recieved renewed attention, above all in the cultural ambit of Chartres. Interest in this dialogue often found expression in commentaries, but also in philosophical, theological, and exegetical treatises, evidently inspired by Timaeus's cosmological teachings. Some of those mediaeval works evocatively identified the anima mundi as the Holy Spirit, in accordance with an exegesis, which had some success in the early decades of the twelfth century, but was then formally condemned at the Coundil of Sens in 1140-1141. among the more prominent writers who had earlier supported that identification was William of Conches. This master of Chartres produced, not only "glosses" on autores such as Boethius, Plato, Macrobius, Priscianus, but also two treatises of natural philosophy, namely the Philosophia - which, shortly before the Council of Sens, was the target of a pitiless bill of indictment, known as De erroribus Guillelmide Conchis, by the Cistercian monk William of Saint-Thierry - and tha Dragmaticon Philosophiae. The latter treatise takes up again the contents of the Philosophia, with additions and significant re-writings, but without any reference, ever, to any teaching on the anima mundi and its supposed correspondence to the Holy Spirit. It has often been said - also in recent studies - that among the teachings condemned in the De erroribus there were also the two mentioned above, and that, therefore, William of Conches's choice to expunge them from the Dragmation Philosophiae must have been due both to the indictment by William of Saint Thierry, and to their having been condemned by the Council of Sens. However, analysis of the polemical work by William of Saint Thierry renders it evident that he never explicitly attributes the "correspondence" doctrine to William of Conches, and that, in effect, he could never heve done it. For though, indeed, the author from Chartres does uphold this doctrine explicitly in his "Glosses" on the Consolatio Philosophiae, already in his Philosophia and then, in his "Glosses" on Timaeus, he stakes a position of neutrality with regard to this identification (of the anima mundi with the Holy Spirit), presenting it as but one among the widespread positions found at that time. Now though it does make sense to say that William abandoned the doctrine of the anima mundi and tha Holy Spirit being identical because it had been condemned at Sens, it appcars to go somewhat beyond the evidence to claim that he had also abandoned the teaching on tha anima mundi for the same reason; in fact, it was the former that has been judged heretical, not the latter. If William had considered recourse to this cosmological figure truly indispensable in order to explain the cosmic becoming, he would not have given it up so easily. If he did give it up, as he did, he evidently did so for well-founded philosophical reasons. The intention here is to demonstrate that, in the Dragmaticon, William definitively dissolved the integumentum of anima mundi, attributing the prerogatives and the functions, which this cosmological principle had and performed only figuratively, to concrete causal principles, namely to the nature of things and to individual souls.