A memory-based argument for non-reductionism about the transtemporal identity of persons
-
Inan, Daniel [1]
-
[1] Eötvös Loránd University
Eötvös Loránd University
Hungría
-
- Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 45, Nº. 2, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: abr./jun.), págs. 161-216
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
-
Resumen
Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.
