Two arguments for the incoherence of non-teleological deism

• Kyriacou, Christos ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Cyprus

     University of Cyprus

     Chipre

     
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 45, Nº. 2, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: abr./jun.), págs. 82-117
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I argue that one form of deism, what I shall call ‘moderate non-teleological deism’, seems prima facie incoherent (at least on the assumption of the intuitive Anselmian conception of God). I offer two arguments in support of the prima facie incoherence view: the moral irresponsibility argument and the practical irrationality argument. On the one hand, the moral responsibility argument suggests that three of the essential attributes of such a deistic God are inconsistent: omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection. This is, of course, a variation of the well-known argument from evil. On the other hand, the practical rationality argument suggests that were such a deistic God to create the universe but have no further interest, plan or goal for the universe, the very act would have committed a deistic God to practical irrationality. I argue that this result follows from a widely accepted understanding of the nature of practical rationality and agency. I briefly examine some objections to the two arguments and conclude that moderate non-teleological deism seems prima facie incoherent.