Competitive Price-Quality Strategy of Platforms under User Privacy Concerns

• Xudong Lin ^[1] ; Xiaoli Huang ^[1] ; Shuilin Liu ^[1] ; Yulin Li ^[1] ; Hanyang Luo ^[1]
  1. [1] Shenzhen University

     Shenzhen University

     China

     
• Localización: Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, ISSN-e 0718-1876, Vol. 17, Nº. 2, 2022, págs. 571-589
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The behavior-based discrimination price model (BBPD) needs to collect a large amount of user information, which would spark user privacy concerns. However, the literature on BBPD typically overlooks consumer privacy concerns. Additionally, most of the existing research provides some insights from the perspective of traditional privacy protection measures, but seldom discusses the role of quality discrimination in alleviating users’ privacy concerns. By establishing a Hotelling duopoly model of two-period price-quality competition, this paper explores the impact of quality discrimination on industry profits, user surplus, and social welfare under user privacy concerns. The results show that, with the increase of user privacy cost, given weak market competition intensity, quality discrimination can increase users’ surplus and social welfare, thereby alleviating users’ privacy concerns. We then discuss the managerial implications for alleviating consumer privacy concerns. In addition, we take Airbnb as an example to provide practical implications.