Disagreement and Conflict: How Moral and Taste Judgements Do Not Differ
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[1] Universitat de Barcelona
Universitat de Barcelona
Barcelona, España
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- Localización: Theoria : a Swedish journal of philosophy, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 87, Nº. 3, 2021, págs. 837-846
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
Eriksson thinks that moral disagreements are intuitively faulty whereas disagreements about taste are intuitively faultless. He attempts to account for this difference by arguing, first, that moral judgements and taste judgements differ with regard to the presence of a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements and, second, that the intuition that a judgement is mistaken consists in the disposition to challenge it. In this article, I focus on the reasons given to support the first claim and argue that they are not sufficient. First, I assess the thesis that a taste judgement is only contingently connected with a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements. Second, I focus on the claim that a moral judgement is in part a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements. In both cases, I argue that the reasons given fail to disclose any substantial difference between the two domains.
