Deliberative Agency, Self-Control, and the Divided Mind

• Autores: Hannah Altehenger
• Localización: Theoria : a Swedish journal of philosophy, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 87, Nº. 3, 2021, págs. 542-558
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • According to a widely endorsed claim, intentional action is brought about by an agent's desires in accordance with these desires' respective motivational strength. As Jay Wallace has argued, though, this “hydraulic model” of the aetiology of intentional action has a serious flaw: it fails to leave room for genuine deliberative agency. Drawing on recent developments in the debate on self-control, the article argues that Wallace's criticism can be addressed once we combine the hydraulic model with a so-called “divided mind” account of self-control.