Resumen de Economic outcomes and voting behavior: Evidence from greece

Eleftherios Goulas, Christos Kallandranis, Athina Zervoyianni

• We examine to what extent the main predictions of the punishment‐sanctioning model, i.e. that the incumbent parties are supported by voters in good economic times whereas voters deprecate them during bad times, apply in the case of Greece. Using data from 13 peripheries during 2000‐2012, we document that bad economic outcomes and rapid fiscal‐adjustment measures can be linked to the formation of political agendas through national elections. In particular, we find evidence suggesting that low growth, high unemployment and tight fiscal policy make the electorate move to the opposing parties and reduce support for the incumbent parties. In addition, two Greek parties with completely different rhetoric and political ideology, the left‐wing Syriza and the neo‐fascist Golden Down, seem to get the benefit out of hard economic decisions taken by incumbent parties throughout this period.