Shipwreck and piracy. A tale of Danish State Formation, Foreign Policy, and “maritime incompetence"

• Frederik Lynge Vognsen ^[1]
  1. [1] Aarhus University

     Aarhus University

     Dinamarca

     
• Localización: Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar, ISSN-e 2254-6111, Vol. 10, Nº. 20, 2021, págs. 41-63
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Today we think about absolute states as a given thing: of course, states would want the power to carry out their will. However, this ambition is a historical construct. Just as there is power, economic growth and prosperity in controlling markets and setting the international agenda, so too can being powerless, “incompetent” even, be a favourable disposition. If one uses this actively, that is. The present article discusses how not engaging with maritime actors, and not seeking to establish dominion at sea defined the foreign policy by the Danish monarchs in the late medieval period. By not challenging their maritime dominating neighbours, the Hanseatic towns, the Danish monarchs could profit both economically and politically from being seemingly incompetent at protecting their waters. This argument bridges two traditions in Danish histography. The first stresses the problems Danish late medieval monarchs had with securing peace and safe travel within their water territories, and tends to characterize the crown as weak in maritime matters. The other focuses on the Danish control over the three narrow straits that allow passage in-and-out of the Baltic Sea, and characterized the monarchs as important international players. Starting with the immense coastline of the Danish-Norwegian kingdom, this article showcases discussions, conflicts, and laws pertaining to shipwreck, the main reoccurring diplomatic problem between the Hanseatic League and Danish royal officers. This discussion shows how defining violent maritime actors (as pirates) in Denmark in the late Middle Ages, not only had to do with their actions (such as violent plunder), but also had a lot to do with state formation, the emerging chambers of commerce, international diplomacy and political arm wrestling. In this light, rather than understanding the “maritime incompetence” of the Danish monarchs as an unambiguous unfavourable disposition, or as a stepping stone towards territorial supremacy in a modern sense, the article argues that the kings successfully took advantage of this situation when dealing with foreign powers.