Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine

• Kvartiuk, Vasyl ^[1] ; Herzfeld, Thomas ^[1] ; Bukin, Eduard ^[2]
  1. [1] Leibniz-Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), Theodor-Lieser-Str. 2, 06120 Halle (Saale), Germany
  2. [2] Institute of Agricultural Policy and Market Research, Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen, Seckenbergstr. 3, 35390 Giessen, Germany
• Localización: Land use policy: The International Journal Covering All Aspects of Land Use, ISSN 0264-8377, ISSN-e 1873-5754, Nº. 114, 2022
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.