Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

• Autores: A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell
• Localización: American law and economics review, ISSN 1465-7252, Vol. 23, Nº. 2, 2021, págs. 481-519
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.