Divine universal causality and the Particular Problem of Hell: A quiescence solution

• Wood, Adam ^[1]
  1. [1] Department of PhilosophyWheaton College
• Localización: Scientia et fides, ISSN 2300-7648, Vol. 9, Nº. 2, 2021 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Experimental Psychology and the Notion of Personhood), págs. 181-199
• Idioma: inglés
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  • I call the Particular Problem of Hell (PPH) the problem of explaining why God allows a certain set of created persons to populate hell, as opposed to allowing some other set of created persons to do so. This paper proposes a solution to PPH on behalf of proponents of Divine Universal Causality (DUC) — the view, roughly, that God causes everything distinct from himself to exist at any time it exists. Despite initial appearances, I argue, proponents of DUC can adopt a version of the popular approach to the Problem of Hell sometimes called the Choice Model. My proposal is based upon Eleonore Stump's Thomistically-inspired notion that our wills can enter a state of "quiescence" with respect to a given option. While proponents of DUC will, I argue, most likely find Stump's own quiescence-based solution to PPH unacceptable, there is a way of modifying her approach that renders it compatible with God's causing everything distinct from himself, including the free choices of his creatures.