Resumen de The 2021 State of the Union Address—Thinking Big, Thinking Small
Address to the plenary session of the European Parliament. Ursula von der Leyen did so on 15 September 2021.1 Her speech had most of what one would expect from a policy address of this kind, not least platitudes (“I see a strong soul in everything that we do”), sentimentalism (“our youth put meaning into empathy and solidarity”), and slogans (“climate and economic leadership is central to Europe’s global and security objectives”). It was also underpinned by a thread about Europe’s young people. So all-encompassing was this in scope and so enthusiastic the Commission’s President about it that she linked it to the EU’s current exercise in existential group therapy (“we will make sure that young people can help lead the debate in the Conference on the Future of Europe”). This is an eminently sensible idea, given the well known penchant of youth for conferences.
What the 2021 State of the Union address did not have was a grand plan about the future of the Union. Instead, there were references to “tech sovereignty” and the ambition for the EU to become self-sufficient and a major player in the production of semi-conductors. Facing global shortages, these microchips which are essential for a wide range of products including cars and mobile phones have attracted considerable attention recently. In her address, President von der Leyen urged the Union to “be bold again, this time with semi-conductors”. The power of this idea to inspire EU citizens may appear less than self-evident. There was also not much detail about this objective in either her address or a blog entry that Thierry Breton, the Commissioner for Internal Market, published on the same day.2 And yet, for all the policy issues it raises,3 the emphasis on semi-conductors may be viewed as indicative of greater attention to issues that matter without being flashy.
Is this a general trend? Let us turn to a policy that has been characterised traditionally by big statements and grand initiatives, that is security and defence. In her State of the Union address, President von der Leyen did not avoid either oft repeated slogans (“Europe can— and clearly should—be able and willing to do more on its own”) or the ubiquitous reference to the current “time of transition towards a new international order”. She did not shy away from calling for a “European Defence Union” and gave three examples of areas where, “if we develop this political will, there is a lot that we can do at EU level”: sharing intelligence, interoperability and cyber security.
And yet, while the Commission President acknowledged the political underpinnings of the Common Security and Defence Policy (“what has held us back until now is not just a shortfall of capacity—it is the lack of political will”), her proposals (for instance for a Joint Situational Centre) had all the hallmarks of the EU’s longstanding obsession in CSDP with processoriented tinkering.
The emphasis on security and defence policy in the 2021 State of the Union Address is not surprising. The messy withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, the increasingly menacing shadow of Russia and the shock that the Trump years generated in European capitals have raised questions, yet again, about both the Union’s role as a security and defence actor and the ability of the EU Member States to defend themselves. These questions have become ever more complex following Brexit, given the status of the United Kingdom as one of the very few serious European defence players. They have also become more acute for some Member States (such as France) following the launch of the UK, US and Australia pact in the Asia-Pacific. (...)
