Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

• Pasha Andreyanov ^[1] ; Tomasz Sadzik ^[2]
  1. [1] HSE University
  2. [2] UCLA
• Localización: Review of economic studies, ISSN 0034-6527, Vol. 88, Nº 2, 2021, págs. 521-573
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.