In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals

• Autores: Barbara A. Spellman
• Localización: Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, ISSN-e 2604-6202, Nº. 2, 2021, págs. 325-337
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for pro-viding information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reason-ing works.