Consequences of Increased Compensation Disclosure Transparency: Evidence From CEO Pay in Acquiring Firms

• Autores: Isabel Yanyuan Wang, Xue Wang, Daniel Wangerin
• Localización: Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, ISSN-e 2160-4061, ISSN 0148-558X, Vol. 35, Nº 4, 2020, págs. 667-695
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We investigate the consequences of increased compensation disclosure transparency on the pay for chief executive officers (CEOs) in firms that are more prone to a misalignment between manager and shareholder interests. Prior research documents that acquiring CEOs’ pay is insensitive to poor post-deal performance after firms complete large acquisitions. Using the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) compensation disclosure regulation as our empirical setting, we find that this result disappears after firms begin to provide more transparent compensation disclosure. Our cross-sectional analyses show that acquiring firms with higher quality compensation disclosure exhibit greater CEO pay sensitivity to poor post-deal performance after 2006. Our findings indicate that increased compensation disclosure transparency helps strengthen the relation between CEO pay and poor performance in acquiring firms.