Information Exchange Between Administrative and Criminal Enforcement: The Case of the ECB and National Investigative Agencies
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[1] University of Luxembourg
University of Luxembourg
Luxemburgo
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- Localización: Eucrim: the European Criminal Law Associations' fórum, ISSN 1862-6947, Nº. 4, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: The Reception of European Legislation and Case Law in the Member States), págs. 302-309
- Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
The banking system is often at the epicentre of large-scale financial crimes. Recent scandals involving major European credit institutions questioned the role of banking regulators in supporting law enforcement agencies and revealed the weakness of the current interaction between the European Central Bank (ECB) and national actors. Despite its ostensible coherence, the Single Supervisory Mechanism legal framework can prove problematic in terms of efficiency and adequacy in facing global financial crime. This article explores the specific case of information exchange between banking supervisors and criminal investigative authorities at national level. After a descriptive overview of the ECB reporting duties of potential criminal offences, we examine the possibility of a more coherent information exchange system, where a direct channel of communication between the ECB and criminal law enforcement agencies could serve as a better integrated strategy
