SOX Disclosure and the Effect of Internal Controls on Executive Compensation

• Autores: Angelo Paletta, Genc Alimehmeti
• Localización: Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, ISSN-e 2160-4061, ISSN 0148-558X, Vol. 33, Nº 2, 2018, págs. 277-295
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We study the organizational impact of internal control systems, by examining 1,593 firms with 15,606 executives over 2002-2010. We find that internal control systems explain a significant amount of executive and, in particular, CFO compensation, after controlling for other governance, executive personal characteristics, firm, and macroeconomic determinants of pay. Moreover, the negative relationship between pay and internal control systems suggests that executives operating in firms with ineffective internal control systems earn greater compensation. The results of the longitudinal analysis suggest that firms with ineffective internal control systems have greater agency problems and, consequently, greater levels of executive compensation. The CEO pay shows a nonsignificant relationship with internal control systems.