O disjuntivismo fenomênico como defesa do realismo ingênuo

• Borgoni, Daniel ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade Federal de São Paulo

     Universidade Federal de São Paulo

     Brasil

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 24, Nº. 3, 2020, págs. 569-601
• Idioma: portugués
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Phenomenal Disjunctivism as a defense of the Naive Realism
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Phenomenal disjunctivism is put foward in defense of naive realism, the conception of veridical perception according to which physical objects constitute perceptual experience and determine its phenomenal character. However, according to the causal argument we can produce veridical perceptual experiences without physical objects. In defense of naïve realism, phenomenal disjunctivists propose responses to the causal argument mainly based on the characterization of the nature of hallucinatory experience. My aim is to defend that phenomenal disjunctivists do not have succeed in defending naïve realism against the causal argument.