On the ordinary notion of substance: Reply to Abreu Zavaleta

• MARIO GÓMEZ-TORRENTE ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

     Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

     México

     
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 43, Nº. 4 (out./dez.), 2020, págs. 108-115
• Idioma: inglés
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  • Abstract My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.