La actualidad de la distinción entre fenómeno y cosa en sí para la fenomenología. Los diferences significados de la cosa en sí en Kant y Husserl.

• Breuer, Irene ^[1]
  1. [1] Bergische Universität Wuppertal
• Localización: Revista de Estudios Kantianos: Publicación internacional de la Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española, ISSN-e 2445-0669, Vol. 5, Nº. 2, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista de Estudios Kantianos), págs. 331-365
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies both ground on the distinction between the things in themselves and the phenomenon. While for Kant, this distinction rests in the respective faculties and the mediating function of imagination, for Husserl it is a function of the perceptual process itself. Concerning the thing in itself, its main sense for Kant is that of noumenon or intelligible being, while for Husserl it is mainly the ideal of the adequate givenness of a particular reality of the thing. This contribution aims at developping Husserl’s critical reformulation of Kant’s thing in itself by analysing its different senses and interpretations at both authors.