Kant’s Conception of Conscience

• Umut Eldem ^[1]
  1. [1] Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russian Federation Istanbul Esenyurt University, Turkey
• Localización: Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, ISSN-e 2386-7655, Nº. 11, 2020, págs. 110-131
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • In this paper I provide a detailed account of Kant’s conception of conscience in order to answer a significant question that has recently arisen in the secondary literature: How should we understand Kant’s insistence on the infallibility of conscience? Some commentators have tried to make sense of the claim by suggesting that conscience is a special kind of moral judgment, while others have argued that it is a kind of feeling. My contention is that neither option is helpful in comprehending why and how Kant develops his ideas about conscience in this specific and peculiar way. I argue that the appropriate way to understand this conception is to establish its broader significance for Kant’s moral philosophy, together with his understanding of human moral agency.