Rural residential land consolidation (RRLC) in contemporary China refers to activities related to the replanning and reallocation of rural residential land to construct new rural residences, to increase land-use efficiency and to improve rural amenities in the context of rural revitalization. The objective of this study is to elucidate the patterns of revenue distribution in RRLC by addressing the following questions. Given incomplete and ambiguous formal rules in China, how can rural land property rights be delineated to distribute and coordinate interests among stakeholders in RRLC? Furthermore, what are the factors that determine the delineation of rural land property rights to distribute land revenue? A theoretical framework for the delineation of rural land property rights is developed from the perspectives of the institutional environment, governance and resource allocation. A comparative analysis of two typical cases of RRLC in contemporary China is conducted to support the research hypotheses. This study finds that bargaining power is the fundamental determinant of delineating rural land property rights to distribute revenue in RRLC. Furthermore, intergovernmental competition motivates the local government to fully deploy strong bargaining power, while concerns about social stability provide some constraints. A strong capability for collective action reinforces the bargaining power of rural households. This study provides new insights into the delineation of rural land property rights and subsequent revenue distribution based on distinctive institutional settings and RRLC in China, enriching the theoretical and empirical findings in the property rights school. Policy recommendations on revenue sharing of RRLC are proposed accordingly.
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados