What is Nishitani Keiji’s contribution to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science in our century—if there is any? In the era of neuroscience and artificial intelligence, this question is of crucial importance for an assessment of the contemporary relevance of Kyoto School philosophy specifically and Japanese philosophy in general. In that respect, there has been some interest in the possible contributions of Nishida Kitarō’s thought to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, as I believe, Nishitani’s philosophy also has a say in this area. Following that line, I will attempt a synoptic reconstruction of his notion of mind. In order to do this, I will first clarify what view(s) of mind he opposes. Next, on that basis, I will articulate what he considers to be the alternative. Finally, I will suggest some questions that his account raises and require further elucidation.
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