The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent Licensing

• Gerard Llobet ^[1] ; Jorge Padilla ^[2]
  1. [1] CEMFI
  2. [2] Compass Lexecon
• Localización: Documentos de Trabajo ( CEMFI ), Nº. 9 (CEMFI Working Paper 1409, December 2014), 2014
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 2 Citas
• Resumen

  • There is considerable controversy about the relative merits of the apportionment rule (which results in per-unit royalties) and the entire market value rule (which results in ad-valorem royalties) as ways to determine the scope of the royalty base in licensing negotiations and disputes. This paper analyzes the welfare implication of the two rules abstracting from implementation and practicability considerations. We show that advalorem royalties tend to lead to lower prices, particularly in the context of successive monopolies. They benefit upstream producers but not necessarily hurt downstream producers. When we endogenize the investment decisions, we show that a sufficient condition for ad-valorem royalties to improve social welfare is that enticing more upstream investment is optimal or when multiple innovators contribute complementary technologies. Our findings contribute to explain why most licensing contracts include royalties based on the value of sales.