Staatshaftung getäuschter Hoheitsträger?

• Autores: Nils Grosche
• Localización: Die Verwaltung: Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaften, ISSN 0042-4498, Band 52, heft 2, 2019, págs. 181-202
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • The scandal concerning rigged emissions tests to circumvent regulations is regularly not reflected through the lense of the German rules of State liabilty. This lack of attention follows from the fact that compensation for damage caused to individuals is regularly precluded under the German rules of State liability when the underlying regulation scheme is applied diligently by the competent public authority. In consequence, an unlawful market approval by manipulated but lawfully investigating public authorities appears to exclude liability. However, liability under the German rules of State liability is not limited to cases of misconduct by public authorities. Against this background the case is made for a liability of the manipulated State even though there is no evidence of misconduct on behalf of its authorities when applying approval procedures. The proposed special case for State liability rests on two pillars: the structural vulnerability of the relevant approval procedures for manipulation and a high degree of dependency of third party economic actors on the validity of the State’s approval mechanisms.