La selección natural en un mundo físicamente determinado
- Autores: Gustavo Caponi
- Localización: Scripta Philosophiæ Naturalis, ISSN-e 2258-3335, Nº. 7, 2015, págs. 79-95
- Idioma: español
- Enlaces
-
Resumen
From a physicalist point of view, the idea of a causal closure of the physical world is undeniable. That, meanwhile, does not diminish epistemic value, or cognitive relevance, to causal explanations that allude to biological properties that supervenes to physical properties. This becomes clear when one accepts the experimentalist conception of causal explanation; and explanations by natural selection are examples of that. Selective pressures are configurations of variables whose constitution and specific effects we only arrive to know under descriptions that refer to properties that supervene to physical properties.
Those configurations of factors would be causally inert if it were not for their physical incarnation, but they are identifiable and understandable only under those specifically biological descriptions.
