In defense of lightweight Platonism

• Autores: Peter Van Inwagen
• Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 41, Nº. 1, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Meta-metafisica? / coord. por Rosa Maria Lupo), págs. 115-139
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper, I present and defend a metaphysical position I call Lightweight Platonism. The core theses of Lightweight Platonism are: (i) There exist propositions, properties, and relations. (ii) Properties and relations are “alethic” or “proposition like” entities. That is, while propositions are things that are true or false (full stop), properties are things that are true or false of things, and relations are things that are true or false of pluralities of things. (iii) Propositions, properties, and relations are the only abstracta. (iv) All abstracta exist necessarily, and some properties and relations are capable of existing without being instantiated (without being true of anything or any things). (v) Properties and relations “abound” – there is, for example, such a property as that it is either green or not round (or “being either green or not round”). (vi) Abstracta are without causal powers or propensities – they can be neither agents nor patients. (vii) That an object has, or that two or more objects have, a certain property explains nothing about it or them. For example, if an apple is green, and thus has (or instantiates or exemplifies) the property greenness (if that it is green is true of it), its having that property does not explain the fact that it is green; if two apples both green, and thus both have greenness – and are thus of the same color –, their both having greenness does not explain the fact that they are of the same color.