Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

• Autores: Ascensión Andina-Díaz, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 11, Nº 2, 2009, págs. 99-124
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suffer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how parties may exploit this effect to their interest. We characterize the strong perfect equilibria of the game and show that, in equilibrium, the social network determines which party wins the election. We also show that to dispose of the citizens better connected in the network with the other faction is not a guarantee to win the election.