Believing that P requires taking it to be the case that P: a reply to Grzankowski and Sankey

• Simpson, James ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Florida

     University of Florida

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 24, Nº. 1, 2020, págs. 233-237
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • In a recent paper in this journal, Alex Grzankowski argues, contra Howard Sankey, that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true. In this short reply, I’ll agree with Grzankowski that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true, and I’ll argue that Sankey’s recent response to Grzankowski is inadequate as it stands. However, it’ll be my contention that Grzankowski’s argument doesn’t demonstrate that believing that p doesn’t require taking it to be the case that p.