Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms

• Autores: Rodrigo Martins, Victor Castro
• Localización: Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics, ISSN 0305-9049, Vol. 81, Nº. 5, 2019, págs. 1144-1178
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The literature that investigates credit booms has essentially focused on their economic determinants. This paper explores the importance of political conditionings and central bank independence and provides some striking findings on this matter. Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1975q1–2016q4, we find that credit booms are less likely when right‐wing parties are in office, especially in developing countries, and when there is political instability. However, they have not proven to depend on the electoral cycle. More independent Central Banks are also found to reduce the probability of credit booms. Moreover, they seem to be more likely to occur and spread within a monetary union.