Por qué, y cómo, son «inconmensurables» las teorías jurídicas

• Autores: Enrique P. Haba
• Localización: Revista telemática de filosofía del derecho ( RTFD ), ISSN-e 1575-7382, Nº. 22, 2019, págs. 17-78
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Why, and how, theories of law are “incommensurable”.
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• Resumen
  • español

    Las teorías de razonamientos jurídicos ideales iusnormativismo suelen funcionar como «inconmensurables» SEMÁNTICAMENTE. Los modos de habla de esas doctrinas, sus respectivos universos de significaciones encerrado cada cual dogmático-autárquicamente dentro de sí mismo, constituyen las orientaciones hegemónicas en la actual Teoría del Derecho.

    Mas semejante inconmensurabilidad se «di-suelve» (Wittgenstein) si no se evade que las formulaciones de dichas teorías pasen a ser aquilatadas linguo-PRAGMÁTICAMENTE. Así, en vez de sujetarse a unos iusesencialismos, a la respectiva inconmensurabilidad teorético-autista de «habla» convocada por tal o cual doctrina prestigiosa, los exámenes jurídicos realistas (habitualmente silenciados en esa disciplina) abren las puertas del pensamiento jurídico para orientarse en función de los requisitos prácticos necesarios racionalidad instrumental para implementar el derecho positivo como una TECNOLOGÍA SOCIAL propiamente.

  • English

    The theories of ideal legal reasoning normativism in law operate as “incommensurable” discourses at their SEMANTICAL level. Such speech modes furnish the hegemonic trends in current Legal Theory, each one stating their respective universe of meanings dogmatically locked (semantic autarchies). Nevertheless, this kind of incommensurabilities will be 'di-solved” (Wittgenstein) if their postulates are explored on the PRAGMATIC level of legal language. These other approaches are those of legal realism, but their insights are usually kept silent in the studies of that discipline. Legal realists put on the table the crucial (extra-dogmatic!) knowledge about law in action: language indeterminations, ideologies, bureaucratic obstructions, social pressures, etc. So the legal thinking is no more confined to the extra-empirical enclosure of any semantical “heaven” as such aforementioned theories of law in books. Thus, the hermeneutic alternatives in judicial thinking will be judged on attention to the “earth” of law: the effective human behaviors (real thinking, real conducts, real consequences) in the juridical implementation. Realistic jurists seek to make such interpretative choices (in the “frame” of positive law) which may work best on the factsand it doesn’t matter if these legal answers are, or are not, in harmony with the semantics of some doctrine of law professors. This means: instead of submitting the legal reasoning to any essentialistic thought way, its respective theoretical incommensurability of ‘speech’, realistic jurists strive mainly to think in terms of the practical requirements instrumental rationality in order to implement the positive law as a properly discursive SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY.