Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski

Sankey, Howard ^[1]
1. [1] University of Melbourne
  
  University of Melbourne
  
  Australia
Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 23, Nº. 2, 2019, págs. 361-365
Idioma: inglés
Títulos paralelos:
- Neither a truism nor a triviality: reply to Grzankowski
Enlaces
- Texto completo (pdf)

Resumen
- This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.