Land use and decentralized government: A strategic approach for playing a short-sighted equilibrium

• Maria Carmela Aprile ^[1] ; Bruno Chiarini ^[1] ; Elisabetta Marzano ^[2]
  1. [1] University of Naples Parthenope, Italy
  2. [2] University of Naples Parthenope, Italy and CESifo, Germany
• Localización: Land use policy: The International Journal Covering All Aspects of Land Use, ISSN 0264-8377, ISSN-e 1873-5754, Nº. 89, 2019
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper presents a simple strategic model (defined as a shortsighted game) to highlight the incentives for local governments to allow the exploitation of land in areas not suitable for such exploitation due to environmental or other risks. Municipal discretionary policy inevitably produces strategic complementarities and guides individuals to use the land (to choose the most beneficial “shortsighted” Nash equilibrium). In light of these results, it seems possible to state that the definition of non-exploitable territory and the decisions concerning it should not be left to local governments.