Weight Values, Scoring Rules and Abnormally Low Tenders Criteria in Multidimensional Procurement: Effects on Price

• Jorge González Chapela ^[1]
  1. [1] Centro Universitario de la Defensa de Zaragoza
• Localización: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, ISSN 0210-1173, Nº 228, 2019, págs. 55-81
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Many weighing functions are currently in use for evaluating quotes in multidimensional procurement.

    Although these may affect the price paid by the buyer, their design has been little informed by empirical considerations. This paper studies the impacts of weight values, scoring rules, and abnormally low tenders criteria (ALTC) in an original sample of procurements of services. The panel dimension of the data and the rich set of procurement characteristics are exploited to show that convex price scoring rules (PSRs) and increases in the weight for price yield lower prices, whereas independent/interdependent PSRs and different ALTC result in the same price.