Resumen de Linguistic Presentation and Institutional Structure of Legal Decisions: On the Pragmatic Turn of the One-Right-Answer-Thesis
The attempt is to turn around the discussion of the one-right-answer-thesis of the early Dworkin to a more pragmatic perspective. It will be taken for granted that the Dworkinian one-right-answer-thesis is mistaken, but only as a precondition for what follows in this essay, not as it's main subject. 'One-right-answer' will be investigated as a style of speaking, where no room is left for different legal opinions. This style of speaking can be reconstructed as a certain structure of the types of speech acts that are part of every legal decision. It will be examined from the analytic point of view of speech act theory and social ontology of John R. Searle. As a result, a criterion can be given for assessing the normative question of wether the binary linguistic presentation of 'one-right-answer' can be justified, given the falseness of Dworkins thesis.
