Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen und Grenzen der Kooperation von Bund und Ländern

• Autores: Maik Bäumerich, Maximilian Schneider
• Localización: Die Verwaltung: Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaften, ISSN 0042-4498, Band 52, heft 1, 2019, págs. 99-120
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Contributing to the discussion about the constitutional prohibition on cooperation (‘Kooperationsverbot’) In the political discussion, the term ‘Kooperationsverbot’ (prohibition on cooperation) has become a fixed buzzword. It describes a principle of the GermanConstitution that prevents the Federation from supporting the Länder in the allegedly inadequate fulfilment of their tasks, particularly in the field of education. Its constitutional foundation lies in the distribution of powers and finances of the German Constitution between the Federation and the Länder. This distribution is structured differently in the field of jurisdiction, legislation, administration and finance. The overall view of these areas does not lead to a comprehensive prohibition on cooperation, but rather to a prohibition on the mixing of powers. The existing distribution of powers and finances can be reorganized by amending the constitution – but only up to the indispensable area of the federal principle protected b Article 79 (3) of the German Constitution. The current discussion about the expansion of cooperation possibilities between the Federation and the Länder must take greater account of these limits. Restrictions of the sovereignity of the Länder, which result from the creationand expansion of joint powers andfinancial assistance, must be handled restrictively.Theincreasing blending of powersandimplementation of financial assistance are no panacea for deficits in the fulfilment of tasks by the Länder. The long-term solution lies in an adequate financial allocation of the Länder.