Legal accountability of European Central Bank in bank supervision: A case study in conceptualizing the legal effects of Union acts

• Alexander H. Türk ^[1] ; Napoleon Xanthoulis ^[2]
  1. [1] King's College London

     King's College London

     Reino Unido

     
  2. [2] University of Portsmouth

     University of Portsmouth

     Southsea, Reino Unido

     
• Localización: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law, ISSN 1023-263X, Vol. 26, Nº. 1, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: The ECB’s accountability in a multilevel European order), págs. 151-164
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • This contribution offers a conceptual framework that allows a clear and transparent assessment of the legal/judicial accountability of acts adopted within the Single Supervisory Mechanism based on an evaluation of their legal effects. It shows that the Union courts are the relevant judicial forum to hold the European Central Bank to account for acts that have primary legal effects; that is, all acts or omissions that, directly or indirectly, are capable of determining rights or imposing obligations. Such acts can be challenged by way of direct actions under Articles 263 and 265 TFEU. Where the change in the legal position of a person is caused by at least two distinct acts, the former providing the basis for the adoption of the latter binding act without having itself primary legal effect, then the Union courts may review the former act only indirectly, such as via Articles 267 and 277 TFEU. The judicial accountability mechanisms within the Single Supervisory Mechanism mirror the allocation of competences between the national authorities and the European Central Bank within the Single Supervisory Mechanism by providing for a separate but integrated system of judicial review.