Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values

• Björn Brügemann ^[1] ; Pieter Gautier ^[1] ; Guido Menzio ^[2]
  1. [1] VU University Amsterdam

     VU University Amsterdam

     Países Bajos

     
  2. [2] University of Pennsylvania

     University of Pennsylvania

     City of Philadelphia, Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Review of economic studies, ISSN 0034-6527, Vol. 86, Nº 2, 2019, págs. 564-592
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • We study two wage bargaining games between a firm and multiple workers. We revisit the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel. We show that, in the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the gains from trade captured by workers who bargain earlier with the firm are larger than those captured by workers who bargain later, as well as larger than those captured by the firm. The resulting equilibrium payoffs are different from those reported in Stole and Zwiebel as they are not the Shapley values. We propose a novel bargaining game, the Rolodex game, which follows a simple and realistic protocol. In the unique no-delay Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game, the payoffs to the firm and to the workers are their Shapley values.