El conocimiento intuitivo como garante epistémico según William of Ockham y Adam of Wodeham

• Lydia Deni Gamboa ^[1]
  1. [1] Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla

     Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla

     México

     
• Localización: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, ISSN 0068-4023, Nº. 60, 2018, págs. 47-66
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • William of Ockham and Adam of Wodeham on the Intuitive Cognition as an Epistemic Warrant
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• Resumen

  • Adam of Wodeham and William of Ockham ascribe different properties to intuitive apprehensions. The properties that Wodeham ascribes to intuitive cognitions concur with his reading of one of the four scenarios that Ockham proposes in order to test the idea that an intuitive apprehension serves as an epistemic warrant. In this article, I explain that Wodeham avoids skepticism through his account of intuitive cognitions; even though, like Ockham, he accepts that God can cause us to undergo various sorts of mental acts in virtue of which we could believe that something exists when really it does not exist.