Rent Seeking for Export Licenses: Application to the Vietnam Rice Market

• Tan Ngoc Vu ^[1] ; Duc Hong Vo ^[1] ; Michael McAleer ^[2]
  1. [1] Ho Chi Minh City Open University

     Ho Chi Minh City Open University

     Vietnam

     
  2. [2] University of Sydney

     University of Sydney

     Australia

     
• Localización: Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE), ISSN-e 2341-2356, Nº. 13, 2019, págs. 1-35
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology.

    The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.